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T here does not appear to be any dispute about the following facts concerning the assassination of President Abraham Lincoln: that on 14 
April 1865, while sitting in a box at Ford's Theater in Washington, D.C., 
watching a perfonnance of "Our American Cousin," Lincoln was shot and killed 
by John Wilkes Booth; that in jumping from the box to the stage (where he 
delivered the sic semper tyrannis pronouncement) one of Booth's spurs caught on 
a flag decorating Lincoln's box with the result that he fell and broke his leg; that 
despite this he was able to escape from the theater and from Washington; that 
he was later joined in his flight by David E. Herold; that Dr. Samuel Mudd, a 
Booth acquaintance living in Maryland, treated Booth's leg and provided him 
with a makeshift crutch; and that all this occurred five days after Lee's surrender 
to Grant at Appomattox. 
From that point on there is litde agreement on the facts1--and even less on 
the applicable law. However, as to some of the facts which are disputed, there 
is really no basis for argument. For example, it is sometime argued that with 
Lee's surrender the Civil War (or the War Between the States) came to an end. 
That is not so. Lee had merely surrendered the Anny of North em Virginia. The 
Confederate States of America had other armies in the field, armies which 
continued to fight, armies which did not surrender until well after the date of 
the assassination? Moreover, because of the presence of thousands of 
Confederate sympathizers in Washington, martial law had been declared for that 
city, which was fortified and heavily guarded by Union troops, and that status 
still existed on 14 April 1865, when the assassination took place. 
The current manual on the law of war of the United States Anny defines a 
war crime as "a violation of the law of war by any person or persons, military 
or civilian ... 3 Adopting this definition, the sole question that this article will 
attempt to answer is: Was the assassination of Abraham Lincoln by John Wilkes 
Booth (and any co-conspirators) a violation of the law of war and, hence, a war 
crime? To refine our discussion even further: Is the murder of an individual 
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committed in wartime by one or more individuals of the same nationality as the 
victim a war crime? 
If the answer to these questions is in the affirmative, under the law of war a 
military commission would unquestionably have jurisdiction to try the accused 
persons, including Dr. Samuel Mudd, brought before it charged with such an 
offense. If the answer to these questions is in the negative, the question of the 
jurisdiction of a military commission becomes one of constitutional and national 
law which is beyond the purview of this discussion.4 
For our purposes we will assume the worst case for the accused: 1) that the 
evidence established that there was a conspiracy to assassinate President Lincoln; 
2) that the eight individuals convicted by the military commission on 30 June 
1865, including Dr. Samuel Mudd, as well as others who were not charged, 
were parties to that conspiracy;5 3) that all of the conspirators charged, being 
residents of the District of Columbia or of the State of Maryland, were nationals 
of the Union; 4) that, nevertheless, all of the conspirators were strong supporters 
of the Confederate cause; and 5) that the conspiracy to assassinate Lincoln was 
motivated by a desire on their part to help that cause.6 
The charge with respect to which the military commission opened its hearings 
on 9 May 1865, and to which the eight accused pleaded "Not Guilty" on the 
following day, alleged that they "maliciously, unlawfully and traitorously" 
combined, confederated, and .conspired to kill and murder Abraham Lincoln 
and others.7 There is no allegation that their acts were in violation of the law 
of war. The wording of the charge itself demonstrates that the prosecution 
considered the offense charged to be a conspiracy to commit treason by 
murdering the President and his successors-to-be and that it did not consider 
this to be a war crime.8 As the present author has said elsewhere:9 
There are a number of actions which, while they are wartime criminal offenses 
and are punishable by the injured belligerent, do not come within any definition 
of war crimes. Thus, while there is a wide-spread belief that espionage and treason 
are violations of the laws and customs of war and are, therefore, war crimes, 1 0 this 
is not so.ll Intemationallaw does not forbid espionage and treason; national laws 
d 12 o. 
Presumably, the accused, Union citizens, assumed their acts of assassination 
would in some manner benefit the Confederate cause, even at that late date in 
the war. Their acts were, therefore, traitorous-but, as it has just been shown, 
treason is not a violation of the law of war, and it is not a war crime. 
The post-World War II trials in which Germans tried Germans, Austrians 
tried Austrians, Hungarians tried Hungarians, etc., were not true war crimes 
trials. For the most part they were collaborationist (treason) cases and, in many 
cases, prosecuted misuse or abuse of power. Nor were the euthanasia cases or 
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the concentration camp cases (involving actions which took place prior to, and 
after, 1 September 1939, the official date of the beginning of World War II in 
Europe), which were tried by the Germans, true war crimes cases. They were 
violations of German criminal law, which had existed at the time of the offenses, 
but which, for obvious reasons, had not been enforced by Nazi officials.13 
In the Nordhausen Concentration Camp case, the review of the case contains 
the following statement: 
For an illegal act to be a war crime certain elements must be present, viz., (1) the 
act must be a crime in violation of international law; (2) there must be a disparity 
of nationality between the perpetrator and the victim; and (3) the criminal act 
must have been committed as an incident ofwar.14 
These elements were not present in the trial of those alleged to have been parties 
to the conspiracy to assassinate Abraham Lincoln. The act charged was not a 
violation of international law; there was no disparity of nationality between the 
persons charged as perpetrators and the victim; and it is extremely doubtful that 
the assassination of Lincoln may be considered to have been an incident of the 
war. Therefore, it was not a war crime. 
Proponents of the argument that the law of war governed the assassination 
of Abraham Lincoln, a Union citizen, by those who were likewise Union 
citizens, will find support in the trial of Mariano Uyeki,15 a case for which the 
present author can find no justification: 
Mariano Uyeki was born in 1924 in Iloilo, Panay, the Philippines, of Japanese 
parents. When the war broke out in 1941 he apparently suffered at the hands of 
his Filipino schoolmates because he was pro-]apanese and it was alleged that on 
10 May 1942, after the Japanese occupation ofPanay, and without any justification, 
he shot and killed a fellow Filipino teenager. There was some evidence at that 
period he was acting as an interpreter for the Japanese and that he was wearing at 
least parts of a Japanese Army uniform. However, he was not conscripted into the 
Japanese Army until October 1944. He became a prisoner of war on 1 September 
1945. Early in 1946 he was tried for the murder by a United States Military 
Commission. He was convicted and sentenced to death. That conviction was 
vacated because "the validity o~the proceedings is faulty." Unfortunately, there 
is no explanation of the basis for that statement. He then made an application to 
the Supreme Court of the Philippines for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that 
he was a Filipino citizen and that the United States Military Commission had no 
jurisdiction to try him. His application was denied on the ground that even ifhe 
had originally been a national of the Philippines, he had forfeited that nationality 
by rendering military service to the Japanese Government. This was not a decision 
that the military commission had jurisdiction to try him, it was a decision that the 
Supreme Court of the Philippines had no jurisdiction to rule on the jurisdiction 
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of the United States court because he was not a citizen of the Philippines. He was 
retried by another United States Military Commission in April 1946 and was again 
convicted and sentenced to death.16 
Concerning this case the present author went on to say: 
When the offense was conunitted in 1942, it was a matter of the murder of 
one (pro-American) Filipino civilian by another (pro-Japanese) Filipino 
civilian. It was a violation of the criminal law of the Commonwealth of the 
Philippines. Surely, this was a case for the courts of the Philippines and not a 
war crime for trial by a United States Military Conunission. Even though the 
accused may have lost his Filipino nationality in 1944, upon entering the 
Japanese Army, and even though the Philippines were not yet fully 
independent, it did have its own fully-developed criminal justice system. It is 
difficult to find a basis for the jurisdiction of the United States military 
conunission for this offense conunitted in 1942. Regrettably, no afplication 
for a writ of habeas corpus was made to the United States Courts.1 
In other words, it is not believed that motive alone can convert an offense 
which is a violation of national law into one which is a violation ofintemational 
law. Had Booth and his fellow conspirators been disappointed office seekers, 
the assassination of President Lincoln would certainly not have been a war crime, 
and the fact that they acted as they did because of their political motivation, 
because of their desire to support the Confederacy, does not convert a common 
law national crime into an international crime. 
The conclusion is reached that the assassination of President Abraham Lincoln 
by John Wilkes Booth and his fellow conspirators was not a violation of the law 
of war and, therefore, was not a war crime, but was a politically motivated, 
treasonous act committed by Union citizens in the hope that it would help the 
Confederate cause. Accordingly, even if we assume that the evidence supported 
Dr. Mudd's conviction of conspiracy to commit treason and murder under 
national law, he was properly convicted only if a trial by military commission 
at that time and place complied with the constitutional and statutory law of the 
United States. 
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